Description
The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of texts that are both works of fiction and works of philosophy. Specifically, we here focus on two related matters. First, building on work by De Smedt and De Cruz (2015), we consider various conditions that must be satisfied for creating a φiction – i.e., work that is both a fiction and a work of philosophy. Ultimately, we advance a hypothetical intent-condition according to which a φiction is a work of fiction the hypothetical author of which has philosophical intent. This condition, we contend, allows us to properly delineate φictions from mere fictions as it rightly renders Plato’s Dialogues φiction while excluding fictions like Meyer’s Breaking Dawn. Having shown that φictions are possible, we then pivot to consider a related but distinct matter. Phictions are typically extremely short stories “intended to make a philosophical point rather than reward genuine literary interests” (Xhignesse 2020, 677). Examples include Weatherson’s Death on A Freeway (2004, 1), Yablo’s oval maple leaf (2002, 485), and Folde & Wildman’s sample universal fictions (2017). A common response to phictions is they are “thought-experiments, or logicians puzzles, rather than fictions proper” (Xhignesse 2020, 688). Extending the above discussion, we demonstrate that phictions are best understood as a type of φiction: that is, they are both philosophy and fiction. Finally, we conclude by considering the larger impact our discussion of fiction, φiction, and phiction has on how we might go about making fiction and doing philosophy.| Period | 9 Jun 2026 |
|---|---|
| Event title | European Society of Aesthetics Conference 2026 |
| Event type | Conference |
| Location | Jyväskylä, FinlandShow on map |
| Degree of Recognition | International |
Keywords
- fiction
- phiction