Abstract
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 54-66 |
Journal | Top |
Volume | 19 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2011 |
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A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability. / Lazarova, E.A.; Borm, P.E.M.; Montero, M.P.; Reijnierse, J.H.
In: Top, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2011, p. 54-66.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability
AU - Lazarova, E.A.
AU - Borm, P.E.M.
AU - Montero, M.P.
AU - Reijnierse, J.H.
N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2006-16 (rt)
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows one to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.
AB - A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows one to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.
U2 - 10.1007/s11750-009-0079-2
DO - 10.1007/s11750-009-0079-2
M3 - Article
VL - 19
SP - 54
EP - 66
JO - Top
JF - Top
SN - 1134-5764
IS - 1
ER -