A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

E.A. Lazarova, P.E.M. Borm, M.P. Montero, J.H. Reijnierse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows one to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)54-66
JournalTop
Volume19
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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Simple Game
Bargaining
Monotonic
Internal
Coalitions
Coalition Formation
Deviation
Complement
Game

Cite this

Lazarova, E.A. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Montero, M.P. ; Reijnierse, J.H. / A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability. In: Top. 2011 ; Vol. 19, No. 1. pp. 54-66.
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A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability. / Lazarova, E.A.; Borm, P.E.M.; Montero, M.P.; Reijnierse, J.H.

In: Top, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2011, p. 54-66.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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