A Competitive Partnership Formation Process

T. Andersson, J. Gudmundsson, A.J.J. Talman, Z. Yang

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherDepartment of Econometrics
Number of pages18
Volume2013-008
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2013-008

Fingerprint

Existence of equilibrium
Adjustment process
Competitive dynamics
Incentives
Heterogenous agents
Revenue
Equilibrium solution

Keywords

  • Partnership formation
  • adjustment process
  • equilibrium
  • assignment market

Cite this

Andersson, T., Gudmundsson, J., Talman, A. J. J., & Yang, Z. (2013). A Competitive Partnership Formation Process. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-008). Tilburg: Department of Econometrics.
Andersson, T. ; Gudmundsson, J. ; Talman, A.J.J. ; Yang, Z. / A Competitive Partnership Formation Process. Tilburg : Department of Econometrics, 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Andersson, T, Gudmundsson, J, Talman, AJJ & Yang, Z 2013 'A Competitive Partnership Formation Process' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2013-008, Department of Econometrics, Tilburg.

A Competitive Partnership Formation Process. / Andersson, T.; Gudmundsson, J.; Talman, A.J.J.; Yang, Z.

Tilburg : Department of Econometrics, 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-008).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - A group of heterogenous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.

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KW - equilibrium

KW - assignment market

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Andersson T, Gudmundsson J, Talman AJJ, Yang Z. A Competitive Partnership Formation Process. Tilburg: Department of Econometrics. 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper).