A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation

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Abstract

This paper considers situations characterized by a common-pool resource, which needs to be divided among agents. Each of the agents has some claim on this pool and an individual reward function for assigned resources. This paper analyzes not only the problem of max- imizing the total joint reward, but also the allocation of these rewards among the agents. Analyzing these situations a new class of transferable utility games is introduced, called multipurpose resource games. These games are based on the bankruptcy model, as intro- duced by O'Neill (1982). It is shown that every multipurpose resource game is compromise stable. Moreover, an explicit expression for the nucleolus of these games is provided.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherTilburg University
Volume2011-029
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-029

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Resource allocation

Keywords

  • bankruptcy games
  • compromise stability
  • nucleolus

Cite this

Grundel, S., Borm, P. E. M., & Hamers, H. J. M. (2011). A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-029). Tilburg: Tilburg University.
Grundel, S. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Hamers, H.J.M. / A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games : Multipurpose Resource Allocation. Tilburg : Tilburg University, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Grundel, S, Borm, PEM & Hamers, HJM 2011 'A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-029, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games : Multipurpose Resource Allocation. / Grundel, S.; Borm, P.E.M.; Hamers, H.J.M.

Tilburg : Tilburg University, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-029).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Grundel S, Borm PEM, Hamers HJM. A Compromise Stable Extension of Bankruptcy Games: Multipurpose Resource Allocation. Tilburg: Tilburg University. 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).