A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects

H.J.M. Hamers, F. Klijn, M. Slikker, S. van Velzen

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue.We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society.We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages9
Volume2004-88
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2004-88

Keywords

  • game theory
  • cooperative games
  • allocation

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