A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

H.J.M. Hamers; F. Klijn; M. Slikker; S. van Velzen

A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

H.J.M. Hamers
, F. Klijn
, M. Slikker
, S. van Velzen

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

Abstract

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	215-227
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	11
Issue number	2
Publication status	Published - 2009

Cite this

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title = "A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects",

abstract = "We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.",

author = "H.J.M. Hamers and F. Klijn and M. Slikker and \{van Velzen\}, S.",

note = "Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2004-88",

year = "2009",

language = "English",

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pages = "215--227",

journal = "International Game Theory Review",

issn = "0219-1989",

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T1 - A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

AU - Hamers, H.J.M.

AU - Klijn, F.

AU - Slikker, M.

AU - van Velzen, S.

N1 - Appeared earlier as CentER DP 2004-88

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

AB - We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

M3 - Article

SN - 0219-1989

VL - 11

SP - 215

EP - 227

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

IS - 2

ER -

A cooperative approach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

Abstract

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