@techreport{2ac403eaa25e496ba6b3a058a3ddb107,
title = "A Duopoly Experiment on Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D",
abstract = "In this paper an experimental environment to test theoretical predictions concerning R&D behavior of firms in duopoly with allowance for R&D spillovers is created. The design and hypotheses of the experiment are based on the well-known model of d Aspremont and Jacquemin in which R&D behavior of firms either competing or cooperating in R&D, is calculated. No di.erence in behavior between di.erent spillover levels is found. Further, I find that irrespective of the technological spillover level subjects do not always commit to an R&D contract but if they commit to an R&D level in a binding contract, cooperative R&D levels are chosen. When subjects do not or cannot commit to a contract, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium performs well in predicting R&D decisions.",
keywords = "research and development, duopoly, competition, nash equilibrium, technological change",
author = "S. Suetens",
note = "Pagination: 23",
year = "2003",
language = "English",
volume = "2003-77",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Vakgroep CentER",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Vakgroep CentER",
}