A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects

M.A. Estevez Fernandez

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. If the project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considers the case of arbitrary monotonic reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the definition of project games, surplus (cost) sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of the reward (penalty) function at hand. It turns outs that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games. This relation allows us to establish the nonemptiness of the core of project games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages30
Volume2008-84
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-84

Fingerprint

Penalty
Reward
Penalty function
Surplus
Cost sharing
Bankruptcy
Taxation

Keywords

  • Project planning
  • delay
  • expedition
  • cost sharing mechanism
  • surplus sharing mechanism
  • bankruptcy problems
  • taxation problems
  • cooperative game
  • core

Cite this

Estevez Fernandez, M. A. (2008). A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-84). Tilburg: Operations research.
Estevez Fernandez, M.A. / A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects. Tilburg : Operations research, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Estevez Fernandez, MA 2008 'A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2008-84, Operations research, Tilburg.

A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects. / Estevez Fernandez, M.A.

Tilburg : Operations research, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-84).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - This paper analyzes situations in which a project consisting of several activities is not realized according to plan. If the project is expedited, a reward arises. Analogously, a penalty arises if the project is delayed. This paper considers the case of arbitrary monotonic reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative project game determines a set of stable allocations of the total reward (penalty). In the definition of project games, surplus (cost) sharing mechanisms are used to take into account the specific characteristics of the reward (penalty) function at hand. It turns outs that project games are related to bankruptcy and taxation games. This relation allows us to establish the nonemptiness of the core of project games.

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KW - taxation problems

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Estevez Fernandez MA. A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects. Tilburg: Operations research. 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).