A Model of Partnership Formation

A.J.J. Talman, Z.F. Yang

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and competitive environment. We pro- vide necessary and su±cient conditions under which an equilibrium can be attained. In equilibrium, the partner formation and the payoff distribution are endogenously determined. Every agent realizes his full potential and has no incentive to deviate from either staying independent or from the endogenously determined partner and payoff. The partnership formation problem contains the classical assignment market problem as a special case.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages16
Volume2008-103
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-103

Fingerprint

Assignment
Incentives
Competitive environment
Profit

Keywords

  • Partnership formation
  • equilibrium
  • indivisibility
  • assignment market

Cite this

Talman, A. J. J., & Yang, Z. F. (2008). A Model of Partnership Formation. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-103). Tilburg: Operations research.
Talman, A.J.J. ; Yang, Z.F. / A Model of Partnership Formation. Tilburg : Operations research, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Talman, AJJ & Yang, ZF 2008 'A Model of Partnership Formation' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2008-103, Operations research, Tilburg.

A Model of Partnership Formation. / Talman, A.J.J.; Yang, Z.F.

Tilburg : Operations research, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-103).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - A Model of Partnership Formation

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AU - Yang, Z.F.

N1 - Subsequently published in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2011 Pagination: 16

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N2 - This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and competitive environment. We pro- vide necessary and su±cient conditions under which an equilibrium can be attained. In equilibrium, the partner formation and the payoff distribution are endogenously determined. Every agent realizes his full potential and has no incentive to deviate from either staying independent or from the endogenously determined partner and payoff. The partnership formation problem contains the classical assignment market problem as a special case.

AB - This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and how to share the profit in a collaborative and competitive environment. We pro- vide necessary and su±cient conditions under which an equilibrium can be attained. In equilibrium, the partner formation and the payoff distribution are endogenously determined. Every agent realizes his full potential and has no incentive to deviate from either staying independent or from the endogenously determined partner and payoff. The partnership formation problem contains the classical assignment market problem as a special case.

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KW - equilibrium

KW - indivisibility

KW - assignment market

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2008-103

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - A Model of Partnership Formation

PB - Operations research

CY - Tilburg

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Talman AJJ, Yang ZF. A Model of Partnership Formation. Tilburg: Operations research. 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).