A note on passepartout problems

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is, then, how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-9
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
Volume14
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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Bankruptcy
Period of time
Service provider
Revenue
Model
Allocation problem
Allocation rules
Owners
Framework
Context

Cite this

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title = "A note on passepartout problems",
abstract = "This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is, then, how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.",
author = "A. Estevez and P.E.M. Borm and H.J.M. Hamers",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
volume = "14",
pages = "1--9",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd",

}

A note on passepartout problems. / Estevez, A.; Borm, P.E.M.; Hamers, H.J.M.

In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 14, 2012, p. 1-9.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - Estevez, A.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Hamers, H.J.M.

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N2 - This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is, then, how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.

AB - This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system, a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed period of time. The corresponding allocation problem is, then, how to share the total joint revenues of the passepartout system adequately among the service providers. Arguments are provided to model a passepartout problem within the framework of bankruptcy and context-specific properties are considered in order to select an appropriate allocation rule.

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EP - 9

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

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