A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperative Games

J.P.M. Suijs

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This paper extends the definition of the nucleolus to stochastic cooperative games, that is, to cooperative games with random payoffs to the coalitions. It is shown that the nucleolus is nonempty and that it belongs to the core whenever the core is nonempty. Furthermore, it is shown for a particular class of stochastic cooperative games that the nucleolus can be determined by calculating the traditional nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969) of a specific deterministic cooperative game.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER Accounting Research Group
Number of pages34
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper


  • Nucleolus
  • cooperative game theory
  • random variables
  • preferences

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