A relation-algebraic approach to simple games

R. Berghammer, Stefan Bolus, A. Rusinowska, Harrie de Swart

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational specifications for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain fundamental properties of simple games and compute specific players and coalitions. We also apply relation algebra to determine power indices. This leads to relation-algebraic specifications, which can be evaluated with the help of the BDD-based tool Rel View after a simple translation into the tool’s programming language. In order to demonstrate the visualization facilities of Rel View we consider an example of the Catalonian Parliament after the 2003 election.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)68-80
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume210
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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