A Silent Battle over a Cake

J. Gonzalez-Diaz; P.E.M. Borm; H.W. Norde

A Silent Battle over a Cake

J. Gonzalez-Diaz, P.E.M. Borm, H.W. Norde

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

246 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	Microeconomics
Number of pages	15
Volume	2004-119
Publication status	Published - 2004

Publication series

Name	CentER Discussion Paper
Volume	2004-119

Keywords

Game of timing
Nash equilibrium

Access to Document

119

Cite this

@techreport{1864a7b8ff63458b9d359b1f649c40a6,

title = "A Silent Battle over a Cake",

abstract = "The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.",

keywords = "Game of timing, Nash equilibrium",

author = "J. Gonzalez-Diaz and P.E.M. Borm and H.W. Norde",

note = "Pagination: 15",

year = "2004",

language = "English",

volume = "2004-119",

series = "CentER Discussion Paper",

publisher = "Microeconomics",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Microeconomics",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - A Silent Battle over a Cake

AU - Gonzalez-Diaz, J.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Norde, H.W.

N1 - Pagination: 15

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

AB - The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

KW - Game of timing

KW - Nash equilibrium

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2004-119

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - A Silent Battle over a Cake

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

A Silent Battle over a Cake

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this