A Silent Battle over a Cake

J. Gonzalez-Diaz, P.E.M. Borm, H.W. Norde

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages15
Volume2004-119
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2004-119

Fingerprint

Nash equilibrium
Games of timing

Keywords

  • Game of timing
  • Nash equilibrium

Cite this

Gonzalez-Diaz, J., Borm, P. E. M., & Norde, H. W. (2004). A Silent Battle over a Cake. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-119). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Gonzalez-Diaz, J. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Norde, H.W. / A Silent Battle over a Cake. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Gonzalez-Diaz, J, Borm, PEM & Norde, HW 2004 'A Silent Battle over a Cake' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2004-119, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

A Silent Battle over a Cake. / Gonzalez-Diaz, J.; Borm, P.E.M.; Norde, H.W.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-119).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Gonzalez-Diaz J, Borm PEM, Norde HW. A Silent Battle over a Cake. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).