A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium

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Abstract

Abstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper we provide a justification for this idea based on strategic choices of the players. In this way we provide a strategic foundation for proper equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages15
Volume2012-093
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2012-093

Keywords

  • proper equilibrium
  • fall back proper equilibrium

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  • Cite this

    Kleppe, J., Borm, P. E. M., & Hendrickx, R. L. P. (2012). A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-093). Econometrics.