A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium

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Abstract

Abstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper we provide a justification for this idea based on strategic choices of the players. In this way we provide a strategic foundation for proper equilibrium.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages15
Volume2012-093
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2012-093

Fingerprint

Justification
Strategic choice
Experiment
Non-cooperative game

Keywords

  • proper equilibrium
  • fall back proper equilibrium

Cite this

Kleppe, J., Borm, P. E. M., & Hendrickx, R. L. P. (2012). A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-093). Tilburg: Econometrics.
Kleppe, J. ; Borm, P.E.M. ; Hendrickx, R.L.P. / A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium. Tilburg : Econometrics, 2012. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Kleppe, J, Borm, PEM & Hendrickx, RLP 2012 'A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2012-093, Econometrics, Tilburg.

A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium. / Kleppe, J.; Borm, P.E.M.; Hendrickx, R.L.P.

Tilburg : Econometrics, 2012. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-093).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium

AU - Kleppe, J.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Hendrickx, R.L.P.

N1 - Pagination: 15

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Abstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper we provide a justification for this idea based on strategic choices of the players. In this way we provide a strategic foundation for proper equilibrium.

AB - Abstract: Proper equilbrium plays an importent role in the literature on non-cooperative games. The underlying thought experiment is, however, unsatisfying, as it gives no justification for its fundamental idea that severe mistakes are made with a significantly smaller probability than innocuous ones. In this paper we provide a justification for this idea based on strategic choices of the players. In this way we provide a strategic foundation for proper equilibrium.

KW - proper equilibrium

KW - fall back proper equilibrium

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2012-093

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium

PB - Econometrics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Kleppe J, Borm PEM, Hendrickx RLP. A Strategic Foundation for Proper Equilibrium. Tilburg: Econometrics. 2012. (CentER Discussion Paper).