A truth serum for non-Bayesians

Correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes

T.J.S. Offerman, J. Sonnemans, G. van de Kuilen, P.P. Wakker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Proper scoring rules provide convenient and highly efficient tools for incentive-compatible elicitations of subjective beliefs. As traditionally used, however, they are valid only under expected value maximization. This paper shows how they can be generalized to modern (“non-expected utility”) theories of risk and ambiguity, yielding mutual benefits: users of scoring rules can benefit from the empirical realism of non-expected utility, and analysts of ambiguity attitudes can benefit from efficient measurements using proper scoring rules. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility of our generalization.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1461-1489
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Volume76
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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Scoring rules
Risk attitude
Serum
Incentive compatible
Analysts
Expected value
Experiment
Non-expected utility
Realism
Non-expected utility theory

Cite this

Offerman, T.J.S. ; Sonnemans, J. ; van de Kuilen, G. ; Wakker, P.P. / A truth serum for non-Bayesians : Correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. In: Review of Economic Studies. 2009 ; Vol. 76, No. 4. pp. 1461-1489.
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A truth serum for non-Bayesians : Correcting proper scoring rules for risk attitudes. / Offerman, T.J.S.; Sonnemans, J.; van de Kuilen, G.; Wakker, P.P.

In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 76, No. 4, 2009, p. 1461-1489.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AU - van de Kuilen, G.

AU - Wakker, P.P.

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