Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions

J. Prüfer, U. Walz

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

Abstract

We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, existing members trade off the effect of entry on average status of the faculty against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lower-ranking candidates. We argue that in a second-best world majority voting is a good approximation to maximizing aggregate faculty surplus. Our main policy implication is that consensus-based faculties, such as many in Europe, could improve the well-being of their members if they liberalized their internal decision making processes.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherTILEC
Number of pages28
Volume2009-021
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2009-021

Fingerprint

Governance
Surplus
Approximation
Wages
Trade-offs
Ranking
Well-being
Governance structure
Decision-making process
Join
Policy implications
Majority voting
Social interaction

Keywords

  • Academic faculties
  • university governance
  • organizational design
  • status organizations

Cite this

Prüfer, J., & Walz, U. (2009). Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-021). Tilburg: TILEC.
Prüfer, J. ; Walz, U. / Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions. Tilburg : TILEC, 2009. (TILEC Discussion Paper).
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Prüfer, J & Walz, U 2009 'Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2009-021, TILEC, Tilburg.

Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions. / Prüfer, J.; Walz, U.

Tilburg : TILEC, 2009. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2009-021).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Prüfer J, Walz U. Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment Decisions. Tilburg: TILEC. 2009. (TILEC Discussion Paper).