Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions

J. Prüfer, U. Walz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)507-529
JournalPublic Choice
Volume155
Issue number3
Early online date14 Jun 2012
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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governance
candidacy
low wage
voting
Governance
ranking
budget
interaction
Values
Surplus

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Prüfer, J. ; Walz, U. / Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions. In: Public Choice. 2013 ; Vol. 155, No. 3. pp. 507-529.
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Prüfer, J & Walz, U 2013, 'Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions', Public Choice, vol. 155, no. 3, pp. 507-529.

Academic faculty governance and recruitment decisions. / Prüfer, J.; Walz, U.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 155, No. 3, 2013, p. 507-529.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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