Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements

H. Benchekroun, W. Marrouch, A. Ray Chaudhuri

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to be elusive, there is a large and growing support for investment in developing more effective technologies to adapt to climate change. We show that an increase in effectiveness of adaptation will diminish the incentive of individual countries to free-ride on a global agreement over emissions. Moreover, we show that this positive effect of an increase in adaptation's effectiveness can also be accompanied by an increase in the gains from global cooperation over GHGs emissions.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Number of pages27
Volume2011-120
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-120

Fingerprint

Free-riding
Incentives
Greenhouse gas emissions
International environmental agreements
International agreements
Climate change

Keywords

  • adaptation
  • climate change
  • international environmental agreements
  • transboundary pollution

Cite this

Benchekroun, H., Marrouch, W., & Ray Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-120). Tilburg: Economics.
Benchekroun, H. ; Marrouch, W. ; Ray Chaudhuri, A. / Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements. Tilburg : Economics, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Benchekroun, H, Marrouch, W & Ray Chaudhuri, A 2011 'Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-120, Economics, Tilburg.

Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements. / Benchekroun, H.; Marrouch, W.; Ray Chaudhuri, A.

Tilburg : Economics, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-120).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements

AU - Benchekroun, H.

AU - Marrouch, W.

AU - Ray Chaudhuri, A.

N1 - Pagination: 27

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to be elusive, there is a large and growing support for investment in developing more effective technologies to adapt to climate change. We show that an increase in effectiveness of adaptation will diminish the incentive of individual countries to free-ride on a global agreement over emissions. Moreover, we show that this positive effect of an increase in adaptation's effectiveness can also be accompanied by an increase in the gains from global cooperation over GHGs emissions.

AB - While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to be elusive, there is a large and growing support for investment in developing more effective technologies to adapt to climate change. We show that an increase in effectiveness of adaptation will diminish the incentive of individual countries to free-ride on a global agreement over emissions. Moreover, we show that this positive effect of an increase in adaptation's effectiveness can also be accompanied by an increase in the gains from global cooperation over GHGs emissions.

KW - adaptation

KW - climate change

KW - international environmental agreements

KW - transboundary pollution

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2011-120

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements

PB - Economics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Benchekroun H, Marrouch W, Ray Chaudhuri A. Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements. Tilburg: Economics. 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).