@techreport{54bb4094d10948b98b45a2321d199c6f,

title = "Admissibility and Common Knowledge",

abstract = "The implications of assuming that it is commonly known that players consider only admissible best responses are investigated.Within a states-of-the-world model where a state, for each player, determines a strategy set rather than a strategy the concept of fully permissible sets is defined.General existence is established, and a finite algorithm (eliminating strategy sets instead of strategies) is provided.The concept refines rationalizability as well as the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure, and captures a notion of forward induction.When players consider all best responses, the same framework can be used to define the concept of rationalizable sets, which characterizes rationalizability.",

keywords = "game theory",

author = "G.B. Asheim and M. Dufwenberg",

note = "Pagination: 26",

year = "1996",

language = "English",

volume = "1996-16",

series = "CentER Discussion Paper",

publisher = "Microeconomics",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Microeconomics",

}