@techreport{584b127c94e74dbdb4552dd82c32b1bd,
title = "Aftermarkets: The monopoly case",
abstract = "Consider a monopolist who sells a durable good, and repairs the good if it breaks down. Suppose that contracts that specify future repair prices cannot be written, so that there is an aftermarket{"} situation. When consumers are risk-averse, the monopolist chooses inefficiently high repair prices; if complete warranties were possible, he would fully insure consumers by guaranteeing to repair the good at a zero fee. To increase efficiency, the monopolist may attract a rival firm in the aftermarket, or lease the good. The latter option restores first-best efficiency",
keywords = "Monopoly, Leasing, After Sales Service, Repair, microeconomics",
author = "{de Bijl}, P.W.J.",
note = "Pagination: 23",
year = "1995",
language = "English",
volume = "1995-102",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Unknown Publisher",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Unknown Publisher",
}