Abstract
Dutch Abstract: Of President Trump het hardere defensiebeleid dat hij heeft Aangekondigd gedurende zijn campagne daadwerkelijk in de praktijk gaat brengen, zal de toekomst leren. Wat wel vrij zeker is, is dat het Amerikaanse staatsrecht hem nauwelijks zal kunnen hinderen. Dit artikel onderzoekt hoe deze ontwikkeling heeft plaatsgevonden en wat de constitutionele speelruimte is van een hedendaagse Amerikaanse President als het gaat om de inzet van het veiligheidsapparaat van de VS. Het betoogt dat eenieder die hoopt dat de nieuwe President van de VS in toom zal worden gehouden in ieder geval niet moet rekenen op het limiterende vermogen van het Amerikaanse constitutionele recht.
English Abstract: In this article I explain (in Dutch) that during the Cold War and the War on Terror, a development occurred whereby the American president, as commander-in-chief, acquired an ever more independent and powerful position in the field of national security at the expanse of congresional powers. Although this development has a strained relationship with the original plan of the US Constitution, the judiciary has hardly interfered because it has consistently refused to hear the merits in war power cases.The result is that a contemporary American president, as commander-in-chief, is hardly bound by checks and balances. As an empirical matter at least, he has a broad preclusive and unilateral authority to deploy conventional weapons, intelligence units, and use nuclear arms. This article explores how this development has taken place. It argues that whoever hopes that the new American president will be checked should not count on the limiting capability of American constitutional law.
English Abstract: In this article I explain (in Dutch) that during the Cold War and the War on Terror, a development occurred whereby the American president, as commander-in-chief, acquired an ever more independent and powerful position in the field of national security at the expanse of congresional powers. Although this development has a strained relationship with the original plan of the US Constitution, the judiciary has hardly interfered because it has consistently refused to hear the merits in war power cases.The result is that a contemporary American president, as commander-in-chief, is hardly bound by checks and balances. As an empirical matter at least, he has a broad preclusive and unilateral authority to deploy conventional weapons, intelligence units, and use nuclear arms. This article explores how this development has taken place. It argues that whoever hopes that the new American president will be checked should not count on the limiting capability of American constitutional law.
| Translated title of the contribution | As commander in chief president Trump can do almost anything |
|---|---|
| Original language | Dutch |
| Pages (from-to) | 6-13 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Nederlands Juristenblad |
| Volume | 2017 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Jan 2017 |