An Analysis of a Simple Reinforcement Dynamics: Learning to Play an "Egalitarian" Equilibrium

A. Possajennikov

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Abstract

The paper analyses a simple reinforcing dynamics. The dynamics can be interpreted as a learning dynamics with fixed aspiration level. All payoffs are assumed to be above this aspiration level, therefore all strategies are reinforcing. Different versions of the dynamics exhibit different convergence properties. The analysis starts with one-agent decision problems and proceeds to games. Some results are available for decision problems and simple games. For complex games computer simulations are performed. The hypothesis is that the dynamics favors an "egalitarian" equilibrium even if it does not satisfy other refinements.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages26
Volume1997-19
Publication statusPublished - 1997

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1997-19

Keywords

  • Equilibrium selection
  • stochastic learning
  • bounded rationality

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