Abstract
Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the "academic dollars" for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This income indicates academic productivity (facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion); its recirculation to journals further stimulates quality competition.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | Microeconomics |
| Number of pages | 32 |
| Volume | 2007-79 |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
Publication series
| Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2007-79 |
Keywords
- Academic Journals
- Academic Productivity
- Market Design. JEL codes
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Cite this
Prüfer, J., & Zetland, D. (2007). An Auction Market for Journal Articles. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-79). Microeconomics.