An Auction Market for Journal Articles

J. Prüfer, D. Zetland

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the "academic dollars" for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This income indicates academic productivity (facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion); its recirculation to journals further stimulates quality competition.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages32
Volume2007-79
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2007-79

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Auction market
Referees
Productivity
Auctions
Tenure
Income
Economics
Reward
Incentives
Pareto improvement
Quality competition

Keywords

  • Academic Journals
  • Academic Productivity
  • Market Design. JEL codes

Cite this

Prüfer, J., & Zetland, D. (2007). An Auction Market for Journal Articles. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-79). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
Prüfer, J. ; Zetland, D. / An Auction Market for Journal Articles. Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2007. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Prüfer, J & Zetland, D 2007 'An Auction Market for Journal Articles' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2007-79, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

An Auction Market for Journal Articles. / Prüfer, J.; Zetland, D.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2007. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2007-79).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - Economic articles are published very slowly. We believe this results mainly from the poor incentives referees face. We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting papers and demonstrate a strict Pareto-improvement of equilibrium. Besides the benefits of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. In addition, the "academic dollars" for papers sold at auction go to the authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This income indicates academic productivity (facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion); its recirculation to journals further stimulates quality competition.

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KW - Academic Productivity

KW - Market Design. JEL codes

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VL - 2007-79

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BT - An Auction Market for Journal Articles

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

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Prüfer J, Zetland D. An Auction Market for Journal Articles. Tilburg: Microeconomics. 2007. (CentER Discussion Paper).