An auction market for journal articles

J. Prüfer, D. Zetland

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)379-403
JournalPublic Choice
Volume134
Issue number3-4
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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auction
referee
editor
market
dollar
reward
promotion
income
Auction market
Referees
Auctions
Tenure
Income
Reward
Pareto improvement

Cite this

Prüfer, J., & Zetland, D. (2010). An auction market for journal articles. Public Choice, 134(3-4), 379-403.
Prüfer, J. ; Zetland, D. / An auction market for journal articles. In: Public Choice. 2010 ; Vol. 134, No. 3-4. pp. 379-403.
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Prüfer, J & Zetland, D 2010, 'An auction market for journal articles', Public Choice, vol. 134, no. 3-4, pp. 379-403.

An auction market for journal articles. / Prüfer, J.; Zetland, D.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 134, No. 3-4, 2010, p. 379-403.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AB - We recommend that an auction market replace the current system for submitting academic papers and show a strict Pareto-improvement in equilibrium. Besides the benefit of speed, this mechanism increases the average quality of articles and journals and rewards editors and referees for their effort. The “academic dollar” proceeds from papers sold at auction go to authors, editors and referees of cited articles. This nonpecuniary income indicates the academic impact of an article—facilitating decisions on tenure and promotion. This auction market does not require more work of editors.

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