An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets

M. Voorneveld, W. Kets, H.W. Norde

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Abstract

Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent.A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games.The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ.Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages12
Volume2005-53
Publication statusPublished - 2005

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2005-53

Keywords

  • Minimal curb set
  • Consistency

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    Voorneveld, M., Kets, W., & Norde, H. W. (2005). An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-53). Microeconomics.