@techreport{69b8ae9bdda3475c8f75e817b661e2e2,

title = "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets",

abstract = "Norde et al.[Games Econ.Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent.A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games.The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ.Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.",

keywords = "Minimal curb set, Consistency",

author = "M. Voorneveld and W. Kets and H.W. Norde",

note = "Pagination: 12",

year = "2005",

language = "English",

volume = "2005-53",

series = "CentER Discussion Paper",

publisher = "Microeconomics",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Microeconomics",

}