An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property

J.R. van den Brink

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Abstract

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU- games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payos change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games, such as the class of simple games or the class of apex games.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages27
Volume1999-120
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-120

Keywords

  • TU-game
  • Shapley value
  • fairness
  • simple games

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    van den Brink, J. R. (1999). An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-120). Econometrics.