@techreport{49292c72515d42f4a0d4c5a3958527b3,
title = "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders",
abstract = "An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist. We develop a dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation in finitely many rounds. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector.",
keywords = "Dynamic auction, budget constraint, core",
author = "A.J.J. Talman and Z.F. Yang",
year = "2011",
language = "English",
volume = "2011-096",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Econometrics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Econometrics",
}