An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders

A.J.J. Talman, Z.F. Yang

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Abstract

An auctioneer wishes to sell several heterogeneous indivisible items to a group of potential bidders. Each bidder has valuations over the items but faces a budget constraint and may therefore not be able to pay up to his valuations. In such markets, a competitive equilibrium typically fails to exist. We develop a dynamic auction and prove that the auction always finds a core allocation in finitely many rounds. The core allocation consists of an assignment of the items and its associated supporting price vector.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Volume2011-096
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-096

Keywords

  • Dynamic auction
  • budget constraint
  • core

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    Talman, A. J. J., & Yang, Z. F. (2011). An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-096). Econometrics.