An Empirical Analysis of Incremental Capital Structure Decisions Under Managerial Entrenchment

A. de Jong, C.H. Veld

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Abstract

We study incremental capital structure decisions of Dutch companies. From 1977 to 1996 these companies have made 110 issues of public and private seasoned equity and 137 public issues of straight debt. Managers of Dutch companies are entrenched. For this reason a discrepancy exists between managerial decisions and shareholder reactions. Confirming Zwiebel (1996) we find that Dutch managers avoid the disciplining role of debt allowing them to overinvest. However, the market reactions show that this overinvestment behavior is recognized. Our findings also confirm the signalling model of Ross (1977) and the static trade-off model. We do not find a confirmation of the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984). This is probably due to the entrenchment of managers and the prevalence of rights issues.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherFinance
Number of pages33
Volume1998-83
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1998-83

Keywords

  • capital structure
  • companies

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    de Jong, A., & Veld, C. H. (1998). An Empirical Analysis of Incremental Capital Structure Decisions Under Managerial Entrenchment. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1998-83). Finance.