An experimental study into the influence of works council advice on managerial decision-making

S. Sapulete, A. van Witteloostuijn, W. Kaufmann

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies the effect of works council advice on managerial decision-making, aiming to gain more insights into the fundamental mechanisms that may underlie the impact of works council advice. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects played a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma price-setting game as either a manager or works council representative. Half of the managers received an advice to opt for a low or a high price; the other half received no advice. Managers receiving advice to choose a low price (play Nash) have a higher tendency to choose a low price. Subjects with an other-regarding orientation tend to choose a high price. Furthermore, we found an interaction effect of advice for other-regarding managers.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)357-371
JournalScandinavian Journal of Management
Volume30
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2014

Fingerprint

Managers
Experimental study
Managerial decision making
Works councils
Interaction effects
Price setting
Prisoners' dilemma
Laboratory experiments
Prisoner Dilemma

Keywords

  • employee participation
  • managerial decision-making
  • experimental economics
  • advice

Cite this

@article{dd0582e9c8304e0998cef09e7950393c,
title = "An experimental study into the influence of works council advice on managerial decision-making",
abstract = "This paper experimentally studies the effect of works council advice on managerial decision-making, aiming to gain more insights into the fundamental mechanisms that may underlie the impact of works council advice. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects played a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma price-setting game as either a manager or works council representative. Half of the managers received an advice to opt for a low or a high price; the other half received no advice. Managers receiving advice to choose a low price (play Nash) have a higher tendency to choose a low price. Subjects with an other-regarding orientation tend to choose a high price. Furthermore, we found an interaction effect of advice for other-regarding managers.",
keywords = "employee participation, managerial decision-making, experimental economics, advice",
author = "S. Sapulete and {van Witteloostuijn}, A. and W. Kaufmann",
year = "2014",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1016/j.scaman.2014.03.001",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "357--371",
journal = "Scandinavian Journal of Management",
issn = "0956-5221",
publisher = "Elsevier Limited",
number = "3",

}

An experimental study into the influence of works council advice on managerial decision-making. / Sapulete, S.; van Witteloostuijn, A.; Kaufmann, W.

In: Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 30, No. 3, 09.2014, p. 357-371.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - An experimental study into the influence of works council advice on managerial decision-making

AU - Sapulete, S.

AU - van Witteloostuijn, A.

AU - Kaufmann, W.

PY - 2014/9

Y1 - 2014/9

N2 - This paper experimentally studies the effect of works council advice on managerial decision-making, aiming to gain more insights into the fundamental mechanisms that may underlie the impact of works council advice. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects played a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma price-setting game as either a manager or works council representative. Half of the managers received an advice to opt for a low or a high price; the other half received no advice. Managers receiving advice to choose a low price (play Nash) have a higher tendency to choose a low price. Subjects with an other-regarding orientation tend to choose a high price. Furthermore, we found an interaction effect of advice for other-regarding managers.

AB - This paper experimentally studies the effect of works council advice on managerial decision-making, aiming to gain more insights into the fundamental mechanisms that may underlie the impact of works council advice. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects played a two-player Prisoner's Dilemma price-setting game as either a manager or works council representative. Half of the managers received an advice to opt for a low or a high price; the other half received no advice. Managers receiving advice to choose a low price (play Nash) have a higher tendency to choose a low price. Subjects with an other-regarding orientation tend to choose a high price. Furthermore, we found an interaction effect of advice for other-regarding managers.

KW - employee participation

KW - managerial decision-making

KW - experimental economics

KW - advice

U2 - 10.1016/j.scaman.2014.03.001

DO - 10.1016/j.scaman.2014.03.001

M3 - Article

VL - 30

SP - 357

EP - 371

JO - Scandinavian Journal of Management

JF - Scandinavian Journal of Management

SN - 0956-5221

IS - 3

ER -