TY - JOUR
T1 - Announcement, observation and honesty in the voluntary contributions game
AU - Denant-Boemont, L.
AU - Masclet, D.
AU - Noussair, C.N.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - In this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post observation of decisions on voluntary public good provision. We find that requiring announcements, in conjunction with making contribution decisions public, has a significantly positive effect on the average level of contributions. Those treatments, in which announcements are elicited, permit the truthfulness of subjects' announcements to be measured. We find that high contributors are more honest, the truthfulness of others is reciprocated with greater honesty and announcements are more honest when contribution decisions are observable.
AB - In this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post observation of decisions on voluntary public good provision. We find that requiring announcements, in conjunction with making contribution decisions public, has a significantly positive effect on the average level of contributions. Those treatments, in which announcements are elicited, permit the truthfulness of subjects' announcements to be measured. We find that high contributors are more honest, the truthfulness of others is reciprocated with greater honesty and announcements are more honest when contribution decisions are observable.
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2011.00543.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2011.00543.x
M3 - Article
SN - 1468-0106
VL - 16
SP - 207
EP - 228
JO - Pacific Economic Review
JF - Pacific Economic Review
IS - 2
ER -