Abstract
App stores constitute a quintessential multisided platform market, where a few players (Apple and Google) facilitate transactions between third-party suppliers (app developers) and consumers in exchange for a commission fee. Complicating matters, these app stores are embedded in intricate mobile ecosystems with varying degrees of “openness” to third parties. Increasingly, these third parties are complaining about allegedly anticompetitive practices. In particular, the operators of app stores—which are vertically integrated into the supply of apps—are said to preference the distribution of their own apps over those of competitors, levy excessive commission fees, and operate in a non-transparent manner. These complaints are not falling on deaf ears, as the European Commission and national competition authorities have opened investigations, particularly into Apple’s App Store. We believe that app stores constitute the ideal case study to clarify the assessment of abuse of dominance in the platform economy and offer a comprehensive assessment in this article, examining market definition and market power of app stores, the application of various theories of harm (and corresponding legal tests) to their allegedly anticompetitive behaviour, potential justifications for said behaviour, as well as the impact of the new P2B Regulation and on-going regulatory initiatives.
App stores constitute a quintessential multisided platform market, where a few players (Apple and Google) facilitate transactions between third-party suppliers (app developers) and consumers in exchange for a commission fee. Complicating matters, these app stores are embedded in intricate mobile ecosystems with varying degrees of “openness” to third parties. Increasingly, these third parties are complaining about allegedly anticompetitive practices. In particular, the operators of app stores are said to preference the distribution of their own apps over those of competitors, levy excessive commission fees, and operate in a non-transparent manner. We offer a comprehensive assessment under Article 102 TFEU, examining market definition and market power of app stores, the application of various theories of harm (and corresponding legal tests) to their allegedly anticompetitive behaviour, potential justifications for said behaviour, as well as the impact of the new P2B Regulation and on-going regulatory initiatives.
App stores constitute a quintessential multisided platform market, where a few players (Apple and Google) facilitate transactions between third-party suppliers (app developers) and consumers in exchange for a commission fee. Complicating matters, these app stores are embedded in intricate mobile ecosystems with varying degrees of “openness” to third parties. Increasingly, these third parties are complaining about allegedly anticompetitive practices. In particular, the operators of app stores are said to preference the distribution of their own apps over those of competitors, levy excessive commission fees, and operate in a non-transparent manner. We offer a comprehensive assessment under Article 102 TFEU, examining market definition and market power of app stores, the application of various theories of harm (and corresponding legal tests) to their allegedly anticompetitive behaviour, potential justifications for said behaviour, as well as the impact of the new P2B Regulation and on-going regulatory initiatives.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 431-491 |
| Number of pages | 61 |
| Journal | European Competition Journal |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 2-3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |