Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

R.W.J. van Heumen, B. Peleg, S.H. Tijs, P.E.M. Borm

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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Abstract

Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages25
VolumeFEW 680
Publication statusPublished - 1994

Publication series

NameResearch memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
VolumeFEW 680

Fingerprint

Game
Converse
Rationality
Person
Potential Games
Congestion Games
Pareto Optimality
Coalitions
Correspondence

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • Bayesian Games
  • game theory

Cite this

van Heumen, R. W. J., Peleg, B., Tijs, S. H., & Borm, P. E. M. (1994). Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. (Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Vol. FEW 680). Unknown Publisher.
van Heumen, R.W.J. ; Peleg, B. ; Tijs, S.H. ; Borm, P.E.M. / Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. Unknown Publisher, 1994. 25 p. (Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration).
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van Heumen, RWJ, Peleg, B, Tijs, SH & Borm, PEM 1994, Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. FEW 680, vol. FEW 680, Unknown Publisher.

Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. / van Heumen, R.W.J.; Peleg, B.; Tijs, S.H.; Borm, P.E.M.

Unknown Publisher, 1994. 25 p. (Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Vol. FEW 680).

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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van Heumen RWJ, Peleg B, Tijs SH, Borm PEM. Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. Unknown Publisher, 1994. 25 p. (Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration).