Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.
|Number of pages||25|
|Publication status||Published - 1994|
|Name||Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration|
- Game Theory
- Bayesian Games
- game theory
van Heumen, R. W. J., Peleg, B., Tijs, S. H., & Borm, P. E. M. (1994). Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. (Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Vol. FEW 680). Unknown Publisher.