Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

R.W.J. van Heumen, B. Peleg, S.H. Tijs, P.E.M. Borm

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Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages25
VolumeFEW 680
Publication statusPublished - 1994

Publication series

NameResearch memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration
VolumeFEW 680


  • Game Theory
  • Bayesian Games
  • game theory


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