@book{b16fc7d9aee74f3695f23b62ed360b21,
title = "Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games",
abstract = "Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.",
keywords = "Game Theory, Bayesian Games, game theory",
author = "{van Heumen}, R.W.J. and B. Peleg and S.H. Tijs and P.E.M. Borm",
note = "Pagination: 25",
year = "1994",
language = "English",
volume = "FEW 680",
series = "Research memorandum / Tilburg Universtity, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration",
publisher = "Unknown Publisher",
}