Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions

J. Kleppe, J.H. Reijnierse, P. Sudhölter

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of a subcoalition of a grand coalition may only depend on the grand coalition and the size of the subcoalition. Hence, the symmetrically weighted versions of the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel are symmetric, i.e., invariant under symmetries of a game. They may, however, violate anonymity, i.e., they may depend on the names of the players. E.g., a symmetrically weighted nucleolus may assign the classical nucleolus to one game and the per capita nucleolus to another game. We generalize Sobolev’s axiomatization of the prenucleolus and its modification for the nucleolus as well as Peleg’s axiomatization of the prekernel to the symmetrically weighted versions. Only the reduced games have to be replaced by suitably modified reduced games whose definitions may depend on the weight system. Moreover, it is shown that a solution may only satisfy the mentioned sets of modified axioms if the weight system is symmetric.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherDepartment of Econometrics and Operations Research
Number of pages19
Volume2013-007
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2013-007

Fingerprint

Nucleolus
Axiomatization
Game
Coalitions
kernel
Anonymity
Violate
Axioms
Excess
Assign
If and only if
Symmetry
Generalise
Invariant

Keywords

  • TU game · Nucleolus · Kernel

Cite this

Kleppe, J., Reijnierse, J. H., & Sudhölter, P. (2013). Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-007). Tilburg: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research.
Kleppe, J. ; Reijnierse, J.H. ; Sudhölter, P. / Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions. Tilburg : Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Kleppe, J, Reijnierse, JH & Sudhölter, P 2013 'Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2013-007, Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg.

Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions. / Kleppe, J.; Reijnierse, J.H.; Sudhölter, P.

Tilburg : Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2013-007).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions

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AU - Reijnierse, J.H.

AU - Sudhölter, P.

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N2 - If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of a subcoalition of a grand coalition may only depend on the grand coalition and the size of the subcoalition. Hence, the symmetrically weighted versions of the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel are symmetric, i.e., invariant under symmetries of a game. They may, however, violate anonymity, i.e., they may depend on the names of the players. E.g., a symmetrically weighted nucleolus may assign the classical nucleolus to one game and the per capita nucleolus to another game. We generalize Sobolev’s axiomatization of the prenucleolus and its modification for the nucleolus as well as Peleg’s axiomatization of the prekernel to the symmetrically weighted versions. Only the reduced games have to be replaced by suitably modified reduced games whose definitions may depend on the weight system. Moreover, it is shown that a solution may only satisfy the mentioned sets of modified axioms if the weight system is symmetric.

AB - If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of a subcoalition of a grand coalition may only depend on the grand coalition and the size of the subcoalition. Hence, the symmetrically weighted versions of the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel are symmetric, i.e., invariant under symmetries of a game. They may, however, violate anonymity, i.e., they may depend on the names of the players. E.g., a symmetrically weighted nucleolus may assign the classical nucleolus to one game and the per capita nucleolus to another game. We generalize Sobolev’s axiomatization of the prenucleolus and its modification for the nucleolus as well as Peleg’s axiomatization of the prekernel to the symmetrically weighted versions. Only the reduced games have to be replaced by suitably modified reduced games whose definitions may depend on the weight system. Moreover, it is shown that a solution may only satisfy the mentioned sets of modified axioms if the weight system is symmetric.

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Kleppe J, Reijnierse JH, Sudhölter P. Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions. Tilburg: Department of Econometrics and Operations Research. 2013. (CentER Discussion Paper).