Bank Risk-Taking Abroad

Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter

S. Ongena, A. Popov, G.F. Udell

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper provides the first empirical evidence on how home-country regulation and supervision affects bank risk-tailing in host-country markets. We analyze lending by 136 banks to 8,253 firms in 1,513 different localities across 13 countries. We find strong evidence that laxer regulatory restrictions in the home country are associated with higher loan rejection rates by banks in host-country markets, but that the resulting loans are mostly to small, unaudited, nonexporting, and innovative firms. The results are stronger when banks are less efficiently supervised at home, and they are observed independently from the effect that bank balance sheet have on lending. These findings imply that loose home-country regulation and supervision are associated with important negative externalities for the host-country in terms of more risk-taking by cross-border banks.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherFinance
Volume2011-032
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-032

Fingerprint

Regulation and supervision
Bank risk taking
Home country
Host country
Lending
Loans
Cross-border
Balance sheet
Loan rates
Locality
Bank risk
Empirical evidence
Risk taking
Negative externalities

Keywords

  • bank regulation
  • cross-border financial institutions
  • financial risk

Cite this

Ongena, S., Popov, A., & Udell, G. F. (2011). Bank Risk-Taking Abroad: Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-032). Tilburg: Finance.
Ongena, S. ; Popov, A. ; Udell, G.F. / Bank Risk-Taking Abroad : Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter. Tilburg : Finance, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Ongena, S, Popov, A & Udell, GF 2011 'Bank Risk-Taking Abroad: Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-032, Finance, Tilburg.

Bank Risk-Taking Abroad : Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter. / Ongena, S.; Popov, A.; Udell, G.F.

Tilburg : Finance, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-032).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - This paper provides the first empirical evidence on how home-country regulation and supervision affects bank risk-tailing in host-country markets. We analyze lending by 136 banks to 8,253 firms in 1,513 different localities across 13 countries. We find strong evidence that laxer regulatory restrictions in the home country are associated with higher loan rejection rates by banks in host-country markets, but that the resulting loans are mostly to small, unaudited, nonexporting, and innovative firms. The results are stronger when banks are less efficiently supervised at home, and they are observed independently from the effect that bank balance sheet have on lending. These findings imply that loose home-country regulation and supervision are associated with important negative externalities for the host-country in terms of more risk-taking by cross-border banks.

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Ongena S, Popov A, Udell GF. Bank Risk-Taking Abroad: Does Home-Country Regulation and Supervision Matter. Tilburg: Finance. 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).