Banking: Why Does Regulation Alone Not Suffice? Why Must Governments Intervene?

S.J. Sender

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

Abstract

The position this paper takes is that if all institutional investors are bound by regulations that force them to sell risky assets during downturns, these assets will ultimately be absorbed by unregulated long-term investors. Additional examination shows that, in the current environment, sovereign wealth funds and governments are the possible buyers of these assets. As public intervention entails moral hazard, it follows that for the stability of the financial system throughout the business cycle regulations must be improved. Our proposal
is to include buffers—by which we mean an amount of regulatory capital that will vary over the business cycle and could eventually disappear provided it is recovered over the medium term—above minimum capital requirements in the prudential regulations.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationNice
PublisherEDHEC
Number of pages32
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2008
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameEDHEC position paper

Fingerprint

Assets
Banking
Government
Business cycles
Prudential regulation
Investors
Capital requirements
Sovereign wealth funds
Institutional investors
Public intervention
Regulatory capital
Financial system
Moral hazard
Buyers

Cite this

Sender, S. J. (2008). Banking: Why Does Regulation Alone Not Suffice? Why Must Governments Intervene? . (EDHEC position paper). Nice: EDHEC .
Sender, S.J. / Banking : Why Does Regulation Alone Not Suffice? Why Must Governments Intervene? . Nice : EDHEC , 2008. 32 p. (EDHEC position paper).
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Sender, SJ 2008, Banking: Why Does Regulation Alone Not Suffice? Why Must Governments Intervene? . EDHEC position paper, EDHEC , Nice.

Banking : Why Does Regulation Alone Not Suffice? Why Must Governments Intervene? . / Sender, S.J.

Nice : EDHEC , 2008. 32 p. (EDHEC position paper).

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

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Sender SJ. Banking: Why Does Regulation Alone Not Suffice? Why Must Governments Intervene? . Nice: EDHEC , 2008. 32 p. (EDHEC position paper).