Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility

Bas Dietzenbacher

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.003

Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility

Bas Dietzenbacher

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptcy games with monetary payoffs. Following the game theoretic approach to NTU-bankruptcy problems, we study some appropriate properties and the core of NTU-bankruptcy games. Generalizing the core cover and the reasonable set to the class of NTU-games, we show that NTU-bankruptcy games are compromise stable and reasonable stable. Moreover, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for anNTU-bankruptcy rule to be game theoretic.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	16-21
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	92
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.003
Publication status	Published - Mar 2018

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10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.003

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Research Output

5 Citations
1 Discussion paper

Bankruptcy Games with Nontransferable Utility

Dietzenbacher, B., 1 Feb 2017, Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 14 p. (CentER Discussion Paper; vol. 2017-005).

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

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Cite this

Dietzenbacher, B. (2018). Bankruptcy games with nontransferable utility. Mathematical Social Sciences, 92, 16-21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.12.003

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