Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims

M. Josune Albizuri, Bas Dietzenbacher, J. Zarzuelo

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant
claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher
claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of
another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not
change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages16
Volume2019-033
Publication statusPublished - 14 Nov 2019

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2019-033

Fingerprint

Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
Bargaining theory
Axioms
Bargaining problem
Nash solution

Keywords

  • bargaining with claims
  • independence of higher claims
  • independence of irrelevant claims
  • constrained Nash solution
  • constrained Kalai-Smorodingsky solution

Cite this

Josune Albizuri, M., Dietzenbacher, B., & Zarzuelo, J. (2019). Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-033). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Josune Albizuri, M. ; Dietzenbacher, Bas ; Zarzuelo, J. / Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Josune Albizuri, M, Dietzenbacher, B & Zarzuelo, J 2019 'Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2019-033, CentER, Center for Economic Research, Tilburg.

Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims. / Josune Albizuri, M.; Dietzenbacher, Bas; Zarzuelo, J.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2019. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2019-033).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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T1 - Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims

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N2 - This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevantclaims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higherclaims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim ofanother agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should notchange when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.

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Josune Albizuri M, Dietzenbacher B, Zarzuelo J. Bargaining with Independence of Higher or Irrelevant Claims. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research. 2019 Nov 14. (CentER Discussion Paper).