Abstract
This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard
and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered
by basic insurance.
and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered
by basic insurance.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | TILEC |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Volume | 2014-034 |
| Publication status | Published - 2 Sept 2014 |
Publication series
| Name | TILEC Discussion Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2014-034 |
Keywords
- universal basic health insurance
- voluntary supplementary insurance
- public vs private insurance
- adverse selection
- moral hazard
- cost effectiveness