Basic versus supplementary health insurance

Moral hazard and adverse selection

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)50-58
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Volume128
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2015

Fingerprint

Adverse selection
Health insurance
Moral hazard
Insurance
Insurance market
Cost-effectiveness
Government

Keywords

  • universal basic health insurance
  • voluntary supplementary insurance
  • public vs. private insurance
  • adverse selection
  • moral hazard
  • cost effectiveness

Cite this

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title = "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Moral hazard and adverse selection",
abstract = "This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.",
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Basic versus supplementary health insurance : Moral hazard and adverse selection. / Boone, J.

In: Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 128, 08.2015, p. 50-58.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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