'Be nice, unless it pays to fight'

A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

220 Downloads (Pure)
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Volume2003-011
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2003-011

Keywords

  • game theory
  • mergers
  • Nash equilibrium
  • price competition

Cite this

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title = "'Be nice, unless it pays to fight': A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy",
keywords = "game theory, mergers, Nash equilibrium, price competition",
author = "J. Boone",
year = "2003",
language = "English",
volume = "2003-011",
series = "TILEC Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Unknown Publisher",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Unknown Publisher",

}

'Be nice, unless it pays to fight' : A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy. / Boone, J.

Unknown Publisher, 2003. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-011).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - 'Be nice, unless it pays to fight'

T2 - A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy

AU - Boone, J.

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

KW - game theory

KW - mergers

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - price competition

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2003-011

T3 - TILEC Discussion Paper

BT - 'Be nice, unless it pays to fight'

PB - Unknown Publisher

ER -