Behavioral heterogeneity in economic institutions: An experimental approach

F. Tan

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

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Abstract

The third part, Chapter 6, offers an example of how heterogeneous players affect institutional choices. If players with various costs in cooperation have the opportunity to select an institution that governs them, will they vote for the most efficient institutions? The answer is that it is much harder for them to vote for an ex-post efficient institution compared to a homogenous group studied in the literature. Driven by self-interest, players vote defensively and attempt to avoid possible punishment that might target at themselves.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Noussair, Charles, Promotor
Award date27 Jan 2012
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9789056683078
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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    Tan, F. (2012). Behavioral heterogeneity in economic institutions: An experimental approach. CentER, Center for Economic Research.