Bertrand colludes more than Cournot

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Abstract

On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)71-77
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume10
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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Cournot
Experiment
Tacit collusion
Oligopoly

Cite this

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title = "Bertrand colludes more than Cournot",
abstract = "On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets.",
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Bertrand colludes more than Cournot. / Suetens, S.; Potters, J.J.M.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007, p. 71-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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