Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint

J.M.C. Bouckaert, H.A. Degryse, T. van Dijk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)62-83
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume61
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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Bertrand competition
Discrimination
Market power
Price discrimination
Third-degree price discrimination
Authority
Dominant firm

Cite this

Bouckaert, J.M.C. ; Degryse, H.A. ; van Dijk, T. / Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. In: Journal of Industrial Economics. 2013 ; Vol. 61, No. 1. pp. 62-83.
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Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint. / Bouckaert, J.M.C.; Degryse, H.A.; van Dijk, T.

In: Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2013, p. 62-83.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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