Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint

J.M.C. Bouckaert, H.A. Degryse, T. van Dijk

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power, or dominant firms, from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers' interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power from practicing both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)62-83
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2013


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