@techreport{c988f711642c423d980121cca10272dc,
title = "Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-Discrimination Constraint",
abstract = "Abstract: We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor{\textquoteright}s pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint only leads to higher profits for the unconstrained firm if the monopolistic segment is large enough. Therefore, a regulatory policy objective of encouraging entry is not served by an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint if the monopolistic segment is small. Only when the monopolistic segment is small and rivalry exists in the competitive segment does the asymmetric no-discrimination constraint enhance welfare.",
keywords = "Dominant firms, price discrimination, competition policy, regulation",
author = "J.M.C. Bouckaert and H.A. Degryse and \{van Dijk\}, T.",
note = "Pagination: 24",
year = "2012",
language = "English",
volume = "2012-009",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Finance",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Finance",
}