Earlier research has shown that euro-area primary public debt markets affect secondary markets. We find that more successful auctions of euro area public debt, as captured by higher bid-to-cover ratios, lead to lower secondary-market yields following the auctions. This effect is stronger when market volatility is higher. We rationalize both findings using a simple theoretical model of primary dealer behavior, in which the primary dealers receive a signal about the value of the asset auctioned.
- public debt auctions
- bid-to-cover ratios
- primary and secondary markets
- primary dealers
Beetsma, R. M. W. J., Giuliodori, M., de Jong, F., & Hanson, J. (2018). Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area. Journal of Banking & Finance, 87, 118-134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.10.006