TY - JOUR
T1 - Bio-psycho-social interaction: an enactive perspective
AU - de Haan, Sanneke
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - What are the respective roles of physiological, psychological and social processes in the development of psychiatric disorders? The answer is relevant for deciding on interventions, prevention measures, and for our (self)understanding. Reductionist models assume that only physiological processes are in the end causally relevant. The biopsychosocial (BPS) model, by contrast, assumes that psychological and social processes have their own unique characteristics that cannot be captured by physiological processes and which have their own distinct contributions to the development of psychiatric disorders. Although this is an attractive position, the BPS model suffers from a major flaw: it does not tell us how these biopsychosocial processes can causally interact. If these are processes of such different natures, how then can they causally affect each other? An enactive approach can explain biopsychosocial interaction. Enactivism argues that cognition is an embodied and embedded activity and that living necessarily includes some basic form of cognition, or sense-making. Starting from an enactive view on the interrelations between body, mind, and world, and adopting an organizational rather than a linear notion of causality, we can understand the causality involved in the biopsychosocial processes that may contribute to the development of psychiatric disorders.
AB - What are the respective roles of physiological, psychological and social processes in the development of psychiatric disorders? The answer is relevant for deciding on interventions, prevention measures, and for our (self)understanding. Reductionist models assume that only physiological processes are in the end causally relevant. The biopsychosocial (BPS) model, by contrast, assumes that psychological and social processes have their own unique characteristics that cannot be captured by physiological processes and which have their own distinct contributions to the development of psychiatric disorders. Although this is an attractive position, the BPS model suffers from a major flaw: it does not tell us how these biopsychosocial processes can causally interact. If these are processes of such different natures, how then can they causally affect each other? An enactive approach can explain biopsychosocial interaction. Enactivism argues that cognition is an embodied and embedded activity and that living necessarily includes some basic form of cognition, or sense-making. Starting from an enactive view on the interrelations between body, mind, and world, and adopting an organizational rather than a linear notion of causality, we can understand the causality involved in the biopsychosocial processes that may contribute to the development of psychiatric disorders.
KW - biopsychosocial causality
KW - Biopsychosocial model
KW - causality
KW - enactivism
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85096566628&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09540261.2020.1830753
DO - 10.1080/09540261.2020.1830753
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85096566628
SN - 0954-0261
SP - 1
EP - 8
JO - International Review of Psychiatry
JF - International Review of Psychiatry
ER -