Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal-External Distinction

Sander Verhaegh*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Abstract

Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former's internal-external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine's metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine's own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine's perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine's position is much closer to Carnap's than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)873-890
Number of pages18
JournalErkenntnis
Volume82
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2017

Keywords

  • Ontology

Cite this

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abstract = "Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former's internal-external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine's metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine's own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine's perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine's position is much closer to Carnap's than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects.",
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Blurring Boundaries : Carnap, Quine, and the Internal-External Distinction. / Verhaegh, Sander.

In: Erkenntnis, Vol. 82, No. 4, 08.2017, p. 873-890.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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