Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs

A partial identification approach

C. Bellemare, L. Bissonnette, S. Kroger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)334-345
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume13
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Fingerprint

Partial identification
Social preferences
Inference
Investment game

Cite this

Bellemare, C. ; Bissonnette, L. ; Kroger, S. / Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs : A partial identification approach. In: Experimental Economics. 2010 ; Vol. 13, No. 3. pp. 334-345.
@article{50cac6b08f6c401a9a369127b7e3c535,
title = "Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs: A partial identification approach",
abstract = "We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.",
author = "C. Bellemare and L. Bissonnette and S. Kroger",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1007/s10683-010-9244-6",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "334--345",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "3",

}

Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs : A partial identification approach. / Bellemare, C.; Bissonnette, L.; Kroger, S.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2010, p. 334-345.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bounding preference parameters under different assumptions about beliefs

T2 - A partial identification approach

AU - Bellemare, C.

AU - Bissonnette, L.

AU - Kroger, S.

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.

AB - We show how bounds around preferences parameters can be estimated under various levels of assumptions concerning the beliefs of senders in the investment game. We contrast these bounds with point estimates of the preference parameters obtained using non-incentivized subjective belief data. Our point estimates suggest that expected responses and social preferences both play a significant role in determining investment in the game. Moreover, these point estimates fall within our most reasonable bounds. This suggests that credible inferences can be obtained using non-incentivized beliefs.

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-010-9244-6

DO - 10.1007/s10683-010-9244-6

M3 - Article

VL - 13

SP - 334

EP - 345

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

SN - 1386-4157

IS - 3

ER -