Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

M.J. Larrain Aylwin; J.O. Prüfer

Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

M.J. Larrain Aylwin, J.O. Prüfer

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Abstract

Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	Information Management
Number of pages	40
Volume	2014-043
Publication status	Published - 21 Nov 2014

Publication series

Name	TILEC Discussion Paper
Volume	2014-043

Keywords

Business Associations
Trade Associations
Professional organizations
guilds
Lobbying
Private Ordering
Endogenous Institutions
Quality of Legal Institutions

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2014-043Submitted manuscript, 417 KB

Cite this

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title = "Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions",

abstract = "Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations{\textquoteright} functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.",

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N2 - Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.

AB - Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.

KW - Business Associations

KW - Trade Associations

KW - Professional organizations

KW - guilds

KW - Lobbying

KW - Private Ordering

KW - Endogenous Institutions

KW - Quality of Legal Institutions

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2014-043

T3 - TILEC Discussion Paper

BT - Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

PB - Information Management

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

Abstract

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Keywords

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