Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions

M.J. Larrain Aylwin, J.O. Prüfer

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherInformation Management
Number of pages40
Volume2014-043
Publication statusPublished - 21 Nov 2014

Publication series

NameTILEC Discussion Paper
Volume2014-043

Fingerprint

Lobbying
Business associations
Prediction
Public choice
Welfare effects
Spillover
Policy making
Nonprofit organization
Economics
Institutional economics
Industrial organization
Property rights
Organizational economics
Securitization

Keywords

  • Business Associations
  • Trade Associations
  • Professional organizations
  • guilds
  • Lobbying
  • Private Ordering
  • Endogenous Institutions
  • Quality of Legal Institutions

Cite this

Larrain Aylwin, M. J., & Prüfer, J. O. (2014). Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-043). Tilburg: Information Management.
Larrain Aylwin, M.J. ; Prüfer, J.O. / Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions. Tilburg : Information Management, 2014. (TILEC Discussion Paper).
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Larrain Aylwin, MJ & Prüfer, JO 2014 'Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions' TILEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2014-043, Information Management, Tilburg.

Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions. / Larrain Aylwin, M.J.; Prüfer, J.O.

Tilburg : Information Management, 2014. (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-043).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - Are business associations - private, formal, nonprofit organizations designed to promote the common interests of their members - positive or negative for the economy and overall welfare? Scholars from institutional and organizational economics, on the one side, and from industrial organization, law & economics, and public choice, on the other side, have given different answers to this question, which is instrumental for policy making. We construct a model that endogenizes association membership of firms and the main functions of associations, which can have positive or negative spillovers on the economy. We derive predictions regarding associations’ functions and their net welfare effects, depending on the level of property rights securitization, which are in line with empirical observations.

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Larrain Aylwin MJ, Prüfer JO. Business Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions. Tilburg: Information Management. 2014 Nov 21. (TILEC Discussion Paper).